Are Interlocutory Qualified Immunity Appeals Lawful? by Solimine, Michael E
Masthead Logo Notre Dame Law Review Online
Volume 94 | Issue 3 Article 4
5-2019
Are Interlocutory Qualified Immunity Appeals
Lawful?
Michael E. Solimine
University of Cincinnati College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr_online
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the
Litigation Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre
Dame Law Review Online by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
94 Notre Dame L. Rev. Online 169 (2019).
 169 
ARE INTERLOCUTORY QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
APPEALS LAWFUL? 
Michael E. Solimine 
For half a century the Supreme Court has held that defendants in civil rights 
actions can avoid monetary liability if they demonstrate a qualified immunity for 
their actions.  And for thirty years, the Court has held that district court denials of 
the qualified immunity defense are immediately appealable under the collateral 
order exception to the final order requirement.  Controversial from the start, the 
qualified immunity defense has recently come under renewed stress, with calls from 
individual Justices and by leading voices in academia to either significantly modify 
or even abolish the defense.  While primarily dealing with substantive aspects of the 
defense, this questioning also suggests a revisiting of the status quo on defendants 
being able to immediately appeal a denial of the defense, a task undertaken by this 
Essay.  After briefly setting out the status quo of the qualified immunity defense, this 
Essay argues that the decisions permitting immediate appealability are dubious on 
doctrinal, functional, and institutional grounds.  It further argues that the decisions 
should either be overruled or significantly limited, and that the Court should leave 
it to the rulemaking process, rather than caselaw, to carve out any exceptions to the 
presumption that denial of such a defense is not immediately appealable. 
INTRODUCTION 
In a word, no.  At least not as presently constituted. 
For over fifty years the Supreme Court has developed various versions of 
qualified immunity, available as a defense for federal and state defendants subject 
to suit for damages in civil rights cases.
1
  And for over thirty of those years, the 
Court has made clear that denials by district courts of that defense are subject to an 
immediate appeal by the defendant under the “collateral order doctrine,” despite the 
interlocutory nature of that trial court decision.
2
  The key decision here granting that 
option to defendants is from 1985, in Mitchell v. Forsyth.
3
 
 
 © 2019 Michael E. Solimine.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and 
distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as 
each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, and 
includes this provision and copyright notice.  
 * Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.  For 
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 1 For an overview of the now-considerable caselaw, see HOWARD M. WASSERMAN, 
UNDERSTANDING CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 113–28 (2d ed. 2018). 
 2 Id. at 168–69. 
 3 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
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Despite its longevity, the qualified immunity defense has recently come under 
increasing stress.  Supreme Court Justices have openly questioned in opinions 
whether and to what extent the defense should exist at all.
4
  Prominent voices in the 
legal academy have increasingly made similar arguments.
5
  The criticisms have 
come from a variety of political perspectives, as demonstrated by the libertarian 
CATO Institute establishing a program in 2018, calling for the curtailment of the 
defense, for the reason that it makes it difficult to hold public officials accountable 
for their actions.
6
 
In that now-burgeoning rethinking of the qualified immunity doctrine, only 
limited attention has been given to revisiting the interlocutory appeals issue.  One 
prominent critic of the doctrine, Professor Joanna Schwartz, has argued that 
empirical studies do not support the putative functional reasons for the doctrine, and 
hence “the policy objectives motivating Mitchell militate in favor of eliminating the 
right of interlocutory appeal.”7  Based in part on her work, one federal district judge, 
in the course of holding that such an interlocutory appeal was frivolous, recently 
opined that Mitchell “was likely wrongly decided.”8  But these are exceptions to the 
rule.
9
 
The substantive questioning of the qualified immunity doctrine suggests 
reopening the issue of the soundness of Mitchell, a task now undertaken in a 
sustained manner by this Essay, which proceeds as follows.  Part I briefly surveys 
the history of the qualified immunity defense, and of the simultaneous holdings that 
trial court denials of that defense are immediately appealable under the collateral 
order doctrine.  Part II summarizes the recent substantive critiques of the qualified 
immunity defense, and then turns to doctrinal, functional, and institutional reasons 
to revisit Mitchell.  That Part concludes that the present status of interlocutory 
appeals is not defensible.  Part III considers how to make interlocutory qualified 
 
 4 See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Ziglar v. 
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870–72 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); see also Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 498–500 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., 
concurring dubitante); Thompson v. Clark, No. 14-CV-7349, 2018 WL 3128975, at *6–13 
(E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2018). 
 5 For a sampling of the recent literature, see William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity 
Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018); Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 
YALE L.J. 2 (2017); Symposium, The Future of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793 
(2018). 
 6 Will Baude, The Cato Institute’s New Civil Rights/Police Accountability Initiative, 
REASON (Mar. 7, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/03/07/the-cato-institutes-new-civil-
rightspoli; see also Alan Feuer, Advocates from Left and Right Ask Supreme Court to Revisit 
Immunity Defense, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/nyregion/qualified-
immunity-supreme-court.html. 
 7 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 75. 
 8 Wheatt v. City of East Cleveland, No. 1:17-CV-377, 2017 WL 6031816, at *1 (N.D. Ohio 
Dec. 6, 2017) (citing, inter alia, Schwartz, supra note 5, at 7, 11), aff’d, 741 Fed App’x 302 (6th 
Cir. 2018).  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision without commenting on the Mitchell issue.  
Wheatt, 741 Fed App’x 302. 
 9 Cf. Baude, supra note 5, at 84 (arguing that the Court has “also given qualified immunity 
special status as a matter of civil procedure,” including favorable treatment under the collateral 
order doctrine). 
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immunity appeals lawful by taking several steps, alone or in combination.  These 
steps include the Supreme Court overruling, or at least significantly modifying, 
Mitchell and its progeny; encouraging the use of interlocutory appeal mechanisms 
other than the collateral order doctrine, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or writs of 
mandamus; and promoting rulemaking as an alternative to permit some of these 
interlocutory appeals.  Any one or more of these steps would place interlocutory 
qualified immunity appeals on a firmer and more coherent jurisprudential footing. 
I.     THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE AND INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS 
A.   Qualified Immunity 
An exhaustive discussion of the history and present status of the qualified 
immunity defense is unnecessary here.  What can be said is that the defense has its 
roots in common-law doctrines that seek to avoid a chilling effect on public officials 
who are enforcing the law, and to protect them from the distractions, costs, and 
burdens of civil litigation.  While not textually mentioned in civil rights statutes that 
create private rights of actions, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defense has been 
assumed to be available for defendants in suits for damages brought under 
Section 1983 and similar causes of action.
10
 
The contours of the defense have shifted over time.  At one point the courts 
considered the defense to be primarily subjective, examining an official’s belief in 
the lawfulness of their actions and their overall good faith.
11
  But this subjective 
focus made it difficult for courts to definitively rule on the defense in a pretrial 
setting.
12
  Acknowledging these problems, the Supreme Court made a key move in 
1982 in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.
13
  There, the Court observed that the subjective aspect 
of the then-defense was “incompatible” with the principle “that insubstantial claims 
should not proceed to trial.”14  The defense was thus shifted to an objective test: 
officials facing damage actions would be shielded from liability if their conduct did 
not violate “clearly established . . . rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”15 
In the three decades since Harlow, the Court has found it necessary to revisit 
the scope of the defense.  Among the issues it has encountered is whether the merits 
of the plaintiff’s case (i.e., whether their federal constitutional or statutory rights 
have been violated) must be resolved before determining whether the rights were 
clearly established; the appropriate level of specificity of the rights in question; and 
whether and to what extent courts can look beyond Supreme Court decisions in 
determining whether a right was clearly established.
16
 
 
 10 See generally WASSERMAN, supra note 1, at 113–15. 
 11 Id. at 115. 
 12 Id. 
 13 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 14 Id. at 815–16. 
 15 Id. at 818. 
 16 For overviews of these issues, see WASSERMAN, supra note 1, at 118–25; Alan K. Chen, 
The Intractability of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1937 (2018). 
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B.   Qualified Immunity and Interlocutory Appeals 
According to statute, if a trial court dismisses a case after a finding that the 
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, then that is a final decision and the 
plaintiff has a right to appeal.
17
  If the trial court rejects the defense, it is interlocutory 
and ordinarily not subject to an immediate appeal.  The principal exception used by 
defendants in that circumstance is the collateral order doctrine.  That doctrine 
originated in 1949 in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
18
 which carved out 
an exception to the final decision statutory requirement for district court decisions 
“collateral” to the merits by giving the statute a “practical rather than a technical 
construction.”19  As articulated in later cases, the collateral order doctrine consists 
of a three-part test: the “small category” of decisions that fall under the doctrine are 
only those “that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the 
merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in 
the underlying action.”20  The doctrine is a “blunt, categorical instrument,”21 because 
once an order is deemed to satisfy the test, all such orders in all cases can be 
immediately appealed.  There is no individualized, order-by-order determination.
22
 
The Court first considered the application of the collateral order doctrine with 
the qualified immunity defense in companion cases dated the same day in 1982: the 
aforementioned Harlow and Nixon v. Fitzgerald.
23
  The latter case involved the 
assertion of an absolute immunity in a damages action against Richard Nixon for 
actions he took as President.
24
  The district court had denied a summary judgment 
motion premised on such an immunity,
25
 but the Supreme Court held that a claim of 
absolute immunity did satisfy the collateral order doctrine.
26
  While not engaging in 
an extended analysis of each of the Cohen criteria,
27
 it emphasized the “serious and 
unsettled” issues regarding the immunity for a President, and the “special solicitude 
due to claims alleging a threatened breach of essential Presidential prerogatives 
under the separation of powers.”28 
Harlow was in a similar procedural posture.  That case involved assertions of 
both absolute and qualified immunity by aides to President Nixon, and the Court 
eventually held that only the latter was available to the defendants.
29
  The district 
court denied a summary judgment motion premised on the defendants’ asserted 
 
 17 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
 18 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 19 Id. at 546. 
 20 Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (quoting Swint v. Chambers 
Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)). 
 21 Id. at 112 (quoting Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 883 (1994)). 
 22 See id. at 112–13. 
 23 457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
 24 Id. at 748. 
 25 Id. at 740–41. 
 26 Id. at 742–43. 
 27 It is worth pointing out that the Court noted that in other cases it had already “held that 
orders denying claims of absolute immunity [were] appealable under the Cohen criteria.”  Id. at 
742. 
 28 Id. at 743. 
 29 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807–13 (1982). 
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immunities, and the defendants invoked the collateral order doctrine to immediately 
appeal.
30
  The Court held that they could do so.
31
  It only briefly discussed the issue, 
holding that an immediate appeal was possible for the same reason it was allowed 
in Nixon.
32
 
Although Mitchell was in turn similarly situated to Harlow, in that it involved 
a civil rights action against another official in the Nixon administration (Attorney 
General John Mitchell), the Court fully addressed the issue of the applicability of 
the collateral order doctrine to the qualified immunity defense.
33
  It advanced several 
reasons why the elements of the doctrine are satisfied for qualified immunity 
interlocutory appeals.  For one, it emphasized the reconceptualization of the defense 
in Harlow, pointing out that Harlow held that the defense was necessary to, among 
other things, avoid government officials being distracted from duties, including both 
the burdens of trial and avoiding pretrial matters like discovery.
34
  As the Court saw 
it, Harlow “thus recognized an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens 
of litigation,” and thus was an “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to 
liability.”35  Thus, like appeals from denials of absolute immunity, a denial is 
“effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”36  The Court also held 
that a “claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff’s 
claim that his rights have been violated.”37  The Court explained that the immunity 
claim was an issue of law, namely, whether the “legal norms” the defendant 
allegedly violated were “clearly established” at the time, even though, the Court 
conceded, it would entail a consideration of the factual allegations.
38
 
Justice Brennan dissented at length on the appealability issue.  Emphasizing 
the narrowness of the collateral order doctrine, he focused on the second and third 
prongs.
39
  On the former, he argued that while the qualified immunity question “is 
not identical to the ultimate question on the merits, the two are quite closely 
related.”40  A trial court, he continued, “seeking to answer either question would 
refer to the same or similar cases and statutes, would consult the same treatises and 
secondary materials, and would undertake a rather similar course of reasoning.”41  It 
 
 30 Id. at 806. 
 31 Id. at 806 n.11. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985).  Lower courts post-Harlow did not 
consider that decision to have resolved the issue.  The Mitchell Court pointed out a circuit split on 
the issue.  Id. at 519 & n.5.  For further discussion of the uncertainty in the lower courts on this 
issue following Nixon, see 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3914.10, at 649 (2d ed. 1992). 
 34 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 526–27. 
 37 Id. at 527–28. 
 38 Id. at 528. 
 39 Id. at 544–45 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 40 Id. at 545. 
 41 Id.  He added that he did not believe that “mere ‘factual overlap’ [was] sufficient to show 
lack of separability,” but rather, “it [was] the legal overlap between the qualified immunity question 
and the merits of the case that renders the two questions inseparable.”  Id. at 546 n.2 (internal 
citation omitted). 
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was not clear, he concluded, that there was a “conceptual distinction” between 
qualified immunity and the merits, much less that they were sufficiently separate 
from each other.
42
 
On the “effectively unreviewable” prong, Brennan argued that the majority 
was reading too much into Harlow’s adoption of an objective standard.43  While that 
standard was meant to give extra protection to public officials, he argued that Harlow 
did not answer the question of “need we . . . take the extraordinary step of excepting 
such officials from the operation of the final judgment rule?”44  He pointed out that 
many types of immunities, and other dispositive issues such as a statute of 
limitations or lack of jurisdiction, will be lost if not immediately reviewed.
45
  While 
granting that the opportunity for an immediate appeal would benefit officials, he 
predicted it would impose “enormous costs on plaintiffs and on the judicial system 
as a whole.”46  “[R]egardless of the merits of his claim to qualified immunity,” he 
lamented, the new right of appeal is a “potent weapon to use against plaintiffs,” and 
“can be expected to be widely pursued.”47 
Two other decisions round out the Court’s jurisprudence on the collateral order 
doctrine in this context: one restricts the right of appeal, the other expands it.  In 
1995, the Court held in Johnson v. Jones
48
 that Mitchell did not extend to any 
disputes over the facts that could be inferred from the record.  So if the defendants 
based their qualified immunity defense on, say, a motion for summary judgment, 
and the plaintiff responded by raising a genuine dispute as to a material fact, then an 
interlocutory appeal would need to be dismissed.
49
  A year later, the Court held in 
Behrens v. Pelletier
50
 that a defendant could potentially pursue multiple 
interlocutory appeals of the qualified immunity issue.  There, a defendant was 
permitted to appeal successive denials of Rule 12(b)(6) and summary judgment 
motions based on that defense.
51
 
 
 42 Id. at 547–50. 
 43 Id. at 551–54. 
 44 Id. at 551–52.  It is worth mentioning that Brennan did not dissent in Harlow, though his 
concurring opinions in that case make no direct mention of the appealability issue.  Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 820–21 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 821–22 (Brennan, White, 
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring). 
 45 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 552–53 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  He 
added that instead of permitting collateral order appeals in all cases, many cases “may well be 
appealable as certified interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or, less likely, on writ of 
mandamus.”  Id. at 554. 
 46 Id. at 555. 
 47 Id. at 555–56. 
 48 515 U.S. 304 (1995). 
 49 Id. at 319–20; see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 773 (2014) (distinguishing 
Johnson as a case involving “evidence sufficiency,” and disputed factual issues, and not legal 
issues, a “core responsibility of appellate courts” (quoting Johnson, 515 U.S. at 314)). 
 50 516 U.S. 299 (1996). 
 51 Id. at 308–10.  Around the same time the Court held that pendent appellate jurisdiction 
could not be used to obtain interlocutory jurisdiction over nonfinal orders, even if such orders were 
intertwined with qualified immunity issues.  Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 38 
(1995). 
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II.     REVISITING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS 
As mentioned at the outset of this Essay, recently there has been a burst of 
doctrinal and institutional critiques of the qualified immunity doctrine.
52
  For 
example, Professor Will Baude argues that legal justifications are lacking.  Thus, he 
argues that, among other things, there is no historical basis for the immunity (it only 
developed, he says, after the passage of Section 1983); it shouldn’t be regarded as 
compensation for arguably mistaken, proplaintiff interpretations of civil rights 
statutes; and it’s not justifiable as akin to a rule of lenity for governmental officials.53  
Empirical studies by Schwartz have, as she sees it, undermined the policy 
justifications advanced by the Court for the doctrine, to protect public officials from 
the financial and distractive burdens of responding to civil rights litigation.  Her 
studies have shown that the vast majority of defendants do not pay money judgments 
or settlements, due to employer indemnity or other factors.
54
  Likewise, only small 
percentages of cases are dismissed solely on qualified immunity grounds.
55
 
These critiques do not map directly on the propriety of allowing interlocutory 
appeals in qualified immunity cases, which focuses on the relationship between trial 
and appellate courts, and the wisdom of placing power in the hands of appellants.  
The competing concerns are well settled: an interlocutory appeal can disrupt trial 
proceedings and cause delay and increased costs for the litigants.  It also risks 
additional and possibly unnecessary work for appellate courts, since an immediate 
appeal may be on a less developed record, and a ruling there may be moot in light 
of what might happen at trial.  The countervailing consideration is that the decision 
sought to be immediately reviewed may be wrong, may improperly (in hindsight) 
burden the course of trial proceedings, and would benefit from immediate correction.  
While the respective considerations are different, the recent criticisms of the 
substance of qualified immunity suggest the need for revisiting the procedural 
apparatus of litigating the defense, particularly when the Court has seemingly given 
privileged status to that litigation.
56
  I next consider doctrinal, functional, and 
institutional criticisms of the current state of interlocutory appeals of the defense. 
 
 52 Cf. Samuel L. Bray, Foreword: The Future of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1793, 1794–96 (2018) (labeling critiques as, among other things, historical, doctrinal, 
functional, and institutional). 
 53 Baude, supra note 5, at 49–77.  This article has been cited by recent decisions.  See Kisela 
v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 
1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Zadeh v. 
Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 499 n.11 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring dubitante); Thompson v. 
Clark, No. 14-CV-7349, 2018 WL 3128975, at *10–11 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2018). 
 54 Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1797, 1804–08 (2018). 
 55 Id. at 1808–09. 
 56 See Baude, supra note 5, at 84–86 (discussing how the Court has given inordinate attention 
to qualified immunity cases through its “shadow docket,” e.g., frequent summary reversals). 
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A.   The Collateral Order Doctrine 
Rarely is the collateral order doctrine discussed without being the subject of 
disparagement.
57
  While ostensibly a “practical construction” of the final order 
statute, it is not obvious how the elaborate three-part test can be derived from the 
spare language of that statute.
58
  More than that, the Court is frequently taken to task 
for its arguably strained and inconsistent applications of the three-part test.  This is 
especially true of the second (the issue being separate from the underlying merits) 
and third (issue must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment) 
prongs of the test.
59
  
The poster child for this criticism has been Mitchell.  Brennan’s arguments that 
the second and third parts of the test were not satisfied have, to many observers, 
stood the test of time.  Consider the former, the assertion that the qualified immunity 
defense is conceptually distinct from the merits of the case.  The defense, in its 
Harlow formulation of not violating clearly established law, overlaps in most cases 
with the law and facts of the merits of the case.
60
  The Court has relieved some of its 
own conceptual problems with this distinction by holding that a qualified immunity 
based on disputed facts cannot be the basis of an interlocutory appeal, though the 
scope of that exception is not clear.
61
 
Recall that Brennan in his Mitchell dissent predicted that courts would consult 
the same or similar legal sources, and engage in similar reasoning, when discussing 
the defense and the merits.
62
  His prediction has largely been borne out.  Consider 
those cases where, because of the procedural posture of the case, the Court has 
 
 57 Bryan Lammon, Finality, Appealability, and the Scope of Interlocutory Review, 93 WASH. 
L. REV. 1809, 1842 & n.180 (2018) (“Indeed, it is probably the most maligned rule of federal 
appellate jurisdiction.” (citing Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate 
Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423, 431 (2013))). 
 58 See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 116 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1165, 1184 (1990); see also Baude, supra note 5, at 84 (referring to the “so-called collateral 
order doctrine”). 
 59 Lammon, supra note 57, at 1842 (summarizing the criticisms).  For a sampling of the 
extensive literature on the collateral order doctrine, see Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order 
Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and Four Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539 (1998); 
Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 
423, 447–59 (2013); Aaron R. Petty, The Hidden Harmony of Appellate Jurisdiction, 62 S.C. L. 
REV. 353, 377–86 (2010).  The Court lost an opportunity in the 2017 Term to revisit the collateral 
order doctrine.  After granting certiorari to resolve the issue of whether a denial of the state action 
immunity defense to antitrust liability was immediately appealable under the doctrine, the case was 
settled and the writ of certiorari dismissed.  See Salt River Project v. Tesla Energy Operations, Inc., 
138 S. Ct. 1323 (2018) (dismissing certiorari).  The author of this Essay was a signatory to an 
amicus curiae brief that argued that the doctrine did not permit an interlocutory appeal in this 
instance.  See generally Brief of Federal Courts Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, 
Salt River, 138 S. Ct. 1323 (No. 17-368). 
 60 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 33, § 3911.2, at 388 (“Conceptual distinctness is a good 
distance removed from full separability.”); Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 VAND. L. 
REV. 821, 855 (2018). 
 61 See Lammon, supra note 57, at 1845–48; supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
 62 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
2019] I N T E R L O C U T O R Y  Q U A L I F I E D  I M M U N I T Y  A P P E A L S  177 
discussed both the merits and the qualified immunity defense.  It is true that in those 
cases, the discussion in the respective parts of the opinion are not identical.  On the 
merits, the Court discusses whether, based on constitutional principles up to the time 
of the decision, there was a constitutional violation.
63
  In contrast, the defense will 
be predicated on Supreme Court (and perhaps lower court) decisions that focus on 
whether that right was “clearly established” on the day of the alleged violation.64  
Both parts of these opinions discuss, in very similar ways, the same facts, and the 
substantive constitutional principles at stake (though at different levels of 
generality).  It is difficult to label these as separate issues in any meaningful sense 
of the term. 
Mitchell does not fare much better under the third prong, that the qualified 
immunity issue is effectively unreviewable after an appeal of a final judgment.  That 
is true, but it is also true of many other issues where review is sought under the 
collateral order doctrine.
65
  To better defend the arcane distinctions it has drawn in 
the third factor, the Court has also emphasized the “importance” of the issues 
involved, and in particular the putative public interests (if any) underlying that 
issue.
66
  Put another way, the importance of an issue is another way of saying that it 
is driven by policy concerns.  From that perspective, it can be said that the qualified 
immunity defense is indeed important: it’s a frequently litigated defense for public 
officials in civil rights actions.  More than that, Nixon and Harlow, at least implicitly, 
were predicated on separation of powers concerns, given that the defendants had 
been very high-ranking officials in the executive branch.  When qualified immunity 
is considered as a potential defense in the many Section 1983 actions brought against 
state officials, then federalism concerns are raised.
67
  One can concede those points 
without necessarily agreeing that all cases raising the qualified immunity defense 
should automatically fall under the collateral order doctrine.  Given the origins of 
the current version of the defense in actions against high-ranking federal officials, 
perhaps the doctrine should only apply to suits against federal officials (and maybe 
not even all of them at that).  In contrast, it should not automatically follow that 
 
 63 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 585–89 (2018) (discussing merits 
of alleged Fourth Amendment violation); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 773–77 (2014) 
(same). 
 64 See e.g., Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589–92 (discussing whether alleged Fourth Amendment 
violated clearly established law at time of the violation); Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 777–81 (same). 
 65 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 33, § 3911, at 346; Baude, supra note 5, at 87; Solimine, 
supra note 58, at 1188. 
 66 Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 881 (1994); see Mohawk Indus., 
Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 109 (2009); see also Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 
502 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (third factor turns on whether “the law . . . deem[s] the right 
important enough to be vindicated by . . . interlocutory appeal.”); RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 1103 (7th ed. 2018) (“Does the comment of Justice 
Scalia in Lauro Lines suggest that the Court has embarked on a process of ad hoc balancing that 
focuses on the Court’s perception of the importance of the interest in avoiding trial?”); cf. WRIGHT 
ET AL., supra note 33, § 3911.5, at 430 (“The ‘important question’ element of collateral order 
doctrine . . . has had a checkered career.”). 
 67 See Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Structure, 117 
MICH. L. REV. 1405 (2019) (discussing separation of powers and federalism aspects of qualified 
immunity). 
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Mitchell applies to all (or perhaps any) of the many civil rights actions against state 
officials.
68
 
B.   Functional Considerations 
Not completely unrelated to the last point about the “importance” of the issue 
in the collateral order doctrine analysis is the argument that overtly pragmatic or 
functional concerns do, or should, inform the application of that doctrine (or other 
exceptions to the final judgment rule).
69
  From that perspective, allowing 
interlocutory appeals of the qualified immunity defense could turn on an assessment 
of the actual litigation of the defense in trial and appellate courts, such as how often 
and with what success the defense is raised in those fora.  In that regard, it seems to 
be an article of faith among scholars and civil rights practitioners that the qualified 
immunity defense is raised in almost all cases at the trial level, is frequently granted 
in those courts,
70
 and that an interlocutory appeal is necessary for appellate courts to 
fully secure the defense.
71
 
But as Schwartz has argued, the empirical evidence from various studies 
addressing these points is a mixed bag; some support the assumptions, others do 
not.
72
  Her own study, of district courts in five circuits over a three-year period, 
showed that while the qualified immunity defense was frequently raised by motions 
to dismiss or for summary judgment, the rate of granting of those motions was not 
high, and even when granted, the entire case was frequently not dismissed due to 
other claims being brought.
73
  Likewise, about twenty-two percent of denials of 
motions on immunity grounds were appealed, and of those, about one-third were 
affirmed, twenty percent were reversed in whole or in part, and the balance were 
withdrawn.
74
  On the basis of the latter data, Schwartz argues that because it “is far 
from clear that interlocutory appeals shield defendants from litigation burdens . . . 
 
 68 Most collateral order decisions do not speak in terms of separation of powers or of 
federalism.  For two cases that do refer to separation of powers, see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 
542 U.S. 367 (2004); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).  In the former decision, the Court 
granted a mandamus petition to review and reverse on an interlocutory order on discovery.  Cheney, 
542 U.S. at 376, 378.  Ordinarily, the Court held, such orders would not be subject to interlocutory 
appellate review, but “separation-of-powers considerations should inform a court of appeals’ 
evaluation of a mandamus petition involving the President or the Vice President.”  Id. at 381–82. 
 69 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 33, § 3913 (discussing pragmatic finality); see also Palmer v. 
City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318–19 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987); 
Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 89 (1975); Solimine, supra note 58, at 1188–89. 
 70 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 5, at 6–7; see also Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, Making a 
Buck While Making a Difference, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 251, 263–64 (2016) (noting that in “almost 
every case litigated against government officials under § 1983, dispositive motions and appeals 
based on qualified immunity arise”). 
 71 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 17–18, 74–75. 
 72 See id. at 7–8. 
 73 Id. at 36–39 (reporting data from district courts). 
 74 Id. at 40–41.  She also reports that plaintiffs appealed about 33% of grants of motions 
based on the immunity, and of those, 65% were affirmed, 8% reversed, and 27% were withdrawn.  
Id. at 41. 
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the policy objectives motivating Mitchell militate in favor of eliminating the right of 
interlocutory appeal.”75 
Schwartz’s empirical study itself might cut different ways regarding the 
propriety of Mitchell.  If the qualified immunity defense does not “play[] a 
controlling role in the resolution”76 of as many civil rights cases as is commonly 
thought in some circles, then perhaps the status quo is not intolerable.  On the other 
hand, the defense is frequently raised at the trial court level, and whatever the 
statistics may show, plaintiffs’ lawyers report that much of their litigation strategy 
is taken up with preparing to defeat the defense, at both the trial and appellate 
levels.
77
  Similarly, anecdotal evidence from district judges suggests that they see 
the raising of the defense as frequently done for mere delay.
78
  More empirical work 
on these issues would shed further light, but the current research suggests that the 
appellate regime is not marked by excessive rates of appeal or of reversal.
79
  To that 
extent, the putative need for Mitchell and it progeny starts to fade. 
C.   Institutional Considerations 
Court decisions holding the collateral order doctrine not satisfied frequently 
engage in reasoning relevant to the continued viability of Mitchell.  For example, in 
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, a unanimous Court in 2009 held that a district 
court order finding the attorney-client privilege to be waived did not fall under the 
doctrine.
80
  In the course of that ruling, the Court stated that “[p]ermitting parties to 
undertake successive, piecemeal appeals of all [such adverse] rulings would unduly 
delay the resolution of district court litigation and needlessly burden the courts of 
appeals.”81  (For some, that is a good description of the result of Mitchell and its 
progeny.)  Moreover, the Court extolled the benefits of other types of interlocutory 
review, including those by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), contempt, and mandamus.
82
  While 
conceding that these other avenues were not the same as a collateral order appeal, 
they would “facilitate immediate review of some of the more consequential attorney-
client privilege rulings.”83  Indeed, the differences were a virtue.  Those other 
 
 75 Id. at 75.  See also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 110 (2009) (referring 
to unlikelihood of a particular type of order (there, the waiver of the attorney-client privilege) being 
reversed as a factor in not holding the collateral order doctrine to be satisfied).   
 76 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 8. 
 77 See, e.g., Gerhardstein, supra note 70, at 263–66. 
 78 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 75 n.223 (citing Solimine, supra note 58, at 1191). 
 79 I previously conducted an empirical study of the reversal rate found in appellate qualified 
immunity decisions from all of the circuits from 1987 to 1989.  Solomine, supra note 58, at 1189.  
I found the rate of reversal, in whole or in part, was about 70%.  Id. at 1190.  While I conceded that 
this relatively high reversal rate, standing alone, might support the need for Mitchell-type 
interlocutory appeals, “the inflexible nature of such appeals—the circuit court must hear the case—
will still burden trial and appellate courts.”  Id.  The relatively high rate of reversals I found might 
be due, in part, to the fact that I did not study officially unpublished decisions, which typically have 
a much higher affirmance rate.  See id. at 1198. 
 80 Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 103. 
 81 Id. at 112. 
 82 Id. at 110–12. 
 83 Id. at 112. 
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interlocutory avenues would not capture all such rulings, but the “blunt, categorical 
instrument” of applying the collateral order doctrine “cannot justify the likely 
institutional costs.”84  Other Court decisions regarding appeals often offer similar 
praise for these alternative avenues.
85
 
Mohawk mentioned another reason for a narrow construction of the collateral 
order doctrine.  It observed that Congress in 1990 and 1992 had amended the Rules 
Enabling Act to permit rulemaking on the issue of what district court decisions can 
be subject to an interlocutory appeal.
86
  Rulemaking, the Court added, has the 
“important virtues” of drawing “on the collective experience of bench and bar . . . 
and it facilitates the adoption of measured, practical solutions.”87  Again, other Court 
decisions have extolled the benefits of rulemaking to better solve disputes over the 
propriety of interlocutory appeals.
88
 
These institutional factors make continued adherence to Mitchell untenable.  
The amendments to the Rules Enabling Act were enacted as a result of a suggestion 
by the Federal Courts Study Committee in 1990, which thought that the confusing 
and complex law on interlocutory appeals could benefit from rulemaking “(by 
broadening, narrowing, or systematizing) decisional results under the finality rule of 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.”89  While one does not need to draw the conclusion that the 
legislation immediately overrules or limits Mitchell and its progeny, it strongly 
suggests that further application or refinement of that decision ought to be deferred 
in lieu of serious consideration of rulemaking on the subject.
90
 
Yet another reason to revisit Mitchell is the availability of § 1292(b) appeals.  
That provision requires that both the district judge and the court of appeals certify 
an interlocutory order for immediate appeal.  It further states that an order must 
involve “a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”91  Some, but certainly not all, 
denials of the qualified immunity defense could, and should,
92
 be certified by a 
 
 84 Id. (citing Dig. Equip. Corp., v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 883 (1994)). 
 85 E.g., Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 906 (2015). 
 86 Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 113–14 (referring to the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
101-650, § 315, 104 Stat. 5089, 5115 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2012)), and the 
Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e))).   
 87 Id. at 114. 
 88 E.g., Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1131 (2018); Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 
1714–15 (2017). 
 89 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 95–
96 (1990).  It should be noted that the Report makes no reference to Mitchell or any other decision.  
For an extensive discussion of this aspect of the Report and of the 1990 and 1992 legislation, see 
Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong 
Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717 (1993). 
 90 Cf. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 119 (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling on the Court to “limit” the 
collateral order doctrine in light of the 1990 and 1992 legislation, though not making clear if the 
doctrine should be entirely abandoned). 
 91 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012). 
 92 See Solimine, supra 58, at 1193–209 (criticizing decisions that have limited § 1292(b) to 
“big cases” or otherwise narrowly interpreted it and calling for increased use of the provision). 
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district judge and the court of appeals under § 1292(b).  It could include those denials 
where the underlying constitutional right, or whether it is clearly established (or 
both), are contestable issues in light of caselaw; where the defense is one of law (i.e., 
not based on contested facts); and where an immediate appeal would likely resolve 
the entire case (i.e., there are no other colorable causes of action which do not 
involve the defense).  This is precisely the sort of nuanced, case-by-case treatment 
appropriate for interlocutory appeals, not the one-size-fits-all regime of Mitchell.  
Indeed, prior to Mitchell, courts were employing § 1292(b) to permit interlocutory 
appeals of some denials of the defense.
93
  That is a good model to return to.
94
 
Finally, interlocutory appeals could be predicated on the narrow mandamus 
option.  The Supreme Court did so to review a discovery order involving the sitting 
Vice President in Cheney v. United States District Court, emphasizing separation of 
powers concerns.
95
  For extraordinary and unusual situations, a writ of mandamus 
could be granted for qualified immunity.  Mitchell itself, with its executive branch 
parallels to Cheney, seems an obvious candidate for granting a writ to review the 
assertion of the qualified immunity defense.  On the other hand, the mandamus 
avenue is much less likely to apply to the denial of the immunity in, say, an ordinary 
civil rights action against a state official. 
III.     MAKING INTERLOCUTORY QUALIFIED IMMUNITY APPEALS LAWFUL 
This Essay has already previewed how interlocutory appeals in qualified 
immunity cases can be placed on a more justified jurisprudential footing.  This Part 
more explicitly considers what can be done to reform the current legal regime.  
Addressed in greater detail here are overruling or limiting Mitchell, sanctioning 
frivolous appeals, and engaging in rulemaking. 
One path would simply be to overrule Mitchell, leaving intact other avenues of 
interlocutory appeals for possible use.
96
  That bold step is unlikely, not least of all 
 
 93 See, e.g., McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 316–17 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per 
curiam); Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822 (3d Cir. 1973). 
 94 In Mitchell itself, the district court, at an earlier stage of the litigation, had refused to certify 
a § 1292(b) appeal on the qualified immunity defense.  Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1208 
(3d Cir. 1979).  In their eventual briefing in the Supreme Court, it is interesting to note that the 
plaintiffs argued that the district judge was correct to deny a § 1292(b) request, given what it 
perceived to be lengthy delays in the case, see Brief for the Respondent at 16 n.8, Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (No. 84-335), while the defendant chastised the district court for not 
certifying a § 1292(b) appeal, given what it called the “weighty contrary authority” on the merits 
of the defense.  Brief for the Petitioner at 23–24, Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511.  In a footnote, the latter 
brief favorably cited a lower court opinion which had used § 1292(b) to hear a qualified immunity 
appeal.  Id. at 24 n.13 (citing McSurely, 697 F.2d 309).  The majority in Mitchell made no mention 
of § 1292(b); Brennan’s dissent did.  See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J., concurring and 
dissenting in part). 
 95 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 382 (2004). 
 96 It may be churlish to point out that Mitchell was a 4–3 decision, with two Justices 
(Rehnquist and Powell) not participating, and for that reason it might be regarded as entitled to less 
precedential weight.  Cf. N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 615–17 (1975) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (unfavorably commenting on prior decision as being 4–3).  See generally 
Thomas M. Burke, Note, Is a 4-3 Decision of the United States Supreme Court the “Supreme Law 
of the Land”?, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 312 (1974). 
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due to collateral order decisions being ostensibly based on statutory interpretation.  
The Court is generally reticent to overrule its statutory interpretation decisions as 
compared to constitutional law decisions on the theory that Congress can more easily 
respond to the former.
97
  Yet, as mentioned, Congress has in effect already responded 
by the 1990 and 1992 legislation authorizing rulemaking to determine the existence 
and scope of interlocutory appeals.  So that should make Mitchell a less secure 
precedent. 
A lesser and more realistic alternative to overruling Mitchell would be to 
judicially limit its scope.
98
  One way to do this would be to read Mitchell as not 
inexorably applying to every single qualified immunity appeal.  This would change 
the “blunt instrument” aspect of the doctrine, and instead permit an appellate court 
to engage in a nuanced analysis of whether a particular interlocutory appeal should 
be permitted.
99
  Such an analysis could be informed by such factors as the suggested 
applicability of § 1292(b) to these appeals, mentioned above.  Other factors could 
also be considered, such as the overall legal and factual complexity of the qualified 
immunity issues, the status of defendant official (federal or state, and the particular 
type of office), and the presence of other issues, among other things. 
A second reform would be to emphasize the current practice of trial and 
appellate courts being able to sanction frivolous appeals.  The Supreme Court in 
Behrens v. Pelletier favorably referred to this authority,
100
 and some lower courts 
have not been hesitant to utilize it.
101
  As Behrens pointed out, designating an appeal 
as frivolous can be coupled with the district court retaining jurisdiction and litigating 
other aspects of the case “pending [presumably] summary disposition of the 
appeal.”102  This reform could leave Mitchell intact for meritorious appeals while 
ameliorating its deleterious impact on both trial and appellate courts. 
 
 97 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV. 157, 
165–66 (2018). 
 98 Showing that this alternative is not inconceivable are statements in Court opinions 
evincing discomfort with the collateral order doctrine in general and (arguably) Mitchell in 
particular.  Thus, even while applying Mitchell, a majority of the Court acknowledged that “[a]s a 
general matter, the collateral order doctrine may have expanded beyond the limits dictated by its 
internal logic and the strict application of the criteria set out in Cohen.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 672 (2009) (5–4, but the dissenters did not address the Cohen issue); see also Mohawk Indus., 
Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 115, 117 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (twice referring to the 
Ashcroft passage above favorably). 
 99 One doctrinal path to limiting (or eliminating) the purely categorical approach would be 
to emphasize, as the Court once did, that collateral orders are only those dealing with “serious and 
unsettled questions.”  Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742–43 (1982); see also Schwartz, supra 
note 54, at 1834 (arguing that the defense could be substantively limited by permitting courts “to 
consider whether qualified immunity would achieve its intended policy goals in particular cases”).   
 100 Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 310–11 (1996). 
 101 See, e.g., McDonald v. Flake, 814 F.3d 804, 816–17 (6th Cir. 2016); Wheatt v. City of 
East Cleveland, No. 1:17-CV-377, 2017 WL 6031816, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2017), aff’d, 
741 Fed. App’x 302 (6th Cir. 2018); Hopper v. Montgomery Cty. Sheriff, No. 3:14-CV-158, 2017 
WL 4870216, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2017) (discussing whether district courts have the power 
described in the text). 
 102 Behrens, 516 U.S. at 310–11; see also Centeno v. City of Fresno, No. 1:16-CV-00653, 
2018 WL 1305764, at *2 (E.D. Cal. March 13, 2018) (discussing whether interlocutory appeal of 
denial of qualified immunity is frivolous in context of granting stay of action pending appeal); 
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Finally, the rulemaking process could be engaged to abolish or change the 
current regime.  The Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules has considered 
proposing rules to codify (and possibly modify) the collateral order doctrine, but in 
2017 decided not to further pursue the topic.
103
  If that effort were revived, at least 
two avenues for Mitchell-type appeals are possible.  One could be to list the types of 
orders that could be subject to immediate review, codifying or modifying the current 
caselaw with respect to the presence of factual issues, the number of appeals possible 
in one case, and the like.
104
  Another avenue would take as a model the one rule that 
has been promulgated under the 1990 and 1992 legislation: Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(f), which gives circuit courts discretion to immediately review 
decisions granting or denying class certification.
105
  No criteria are set out in the rule, 
but appellate courts have developed factors such as whether the class certification 
decision raises novel or unusual legal issues, would effectively terminate the case 
(e.g., if a plaintiff could not realistically proceed with a case absent class 
certification, or a defendant would be subject to disproportionate pressure to settle 
if a class was certified), and at least a preliminary consideration of the likelihood of 
succeeding on the merits (i.e., reversing the decision below).
106
  Similarly, a rule for 
the present topic might vest discretion in the appellate courts to hear interlocutory 
qualified immunity appeals, and the circuit courts could develop nuanced criteria to 
exercise that discretion in a common-law-like way.  The criteria could be informed 
by those suggested above for application of § 1292(b), or for a more nuanced 
application of Mitchell itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Any type of interlocutory appeal unavoidably raises difficult issues of 
balancing the principles of maintaining the efficiencies of the normal trial and 
appellate process with correcting trial court errors and doing justice for litigants.  
Interlocutory appeals of the qualified immunity defense are no different, and a 
perfect resolution of whether and to what extent to permit such appeals is 
impossible.
107
  What can be said is that the current regime, automatically permitting 
 
Gerhardstein, supra note 70, at 264–66 (discussing various strategies for plaintiff’s attorneys in 
civil rights action to dismiss or ameliorate the impact of interlocutory appeals on qualified 
immunity). 
 103 See Lammon, supra note 57, at 1824 n.86 (citing ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE 
RULES, MINUTES OF SPRING 2017 MEETING 10 (2017), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ap05-2017-min_0.pdf). 
 104 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 59, at 613–14 (proposing that rulemaking overrule 
Mitchell, or at least overrule Behrens and only permit one interlocutory appeal); Arielle Herzberg, 
Comment, “The Right of Trial by Jury Shall Be Preserved”: Limiting the Appealability of Summary 
Judgment Orders Denying Qualified Immunity, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 305, 316 (2015) (proposing 
interpretation of Johnson v. Jones but not precise language of any Rule to embody it). 
 105 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 106 See, e.g., In re Johnson, 760 F.3d 66, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2014); In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 
953, 959–61 (6th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 
262 F.3d 134, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 107 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 33, § 3914.10, at 656 (“There is no logic to accommodate 
these conflicting impulses. . . . [B]ut no resolution—not even an eventual frustrated overruling of 
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all such appeals with virtually no intervention possible at the gatekeeping stage by 
district or appellate courts, is on jurisprudentially weak grounds.  As courts and 
policymakers revisit the substance and procedure of the qualified immunity defense 
they should also revisit the Mitchell decision and its progeny to permit some 
interlocutory appeals in a nuanced manner. 
 
 
the Mitchell decision—can resolve the conflict between our simultaneous desires to hold public 
officials to standards of law behavior, to protect public officials who have behaved reasonably 
against the many burdens required to establish reasonableness through the full trial process, and to 
maintain the values served by the final judgment rule.”). 
